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A Critical and Comparative Review of auDRP and
UDRP Domain Name Decisions
Alpana Roy
Western Sydney University
Althaf Marsoof
Kings College London
Domain names are simpliﬁed internet addresses which provide a shorthand way to connect to webpages on the
internet. The exponential increase in the use of the internet has led to a growing number of disputes relating to the
registration and use of domain names. This has also led to the development of legal and quasi-legal rules relating to the
management of domain names and domain name disputes. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(“UDRP”), which was implemented in 1999, provides the international legal framework for the resolution of domain
name disputes concerning generic top-level domains (“gTLDs”), such as “.com”. National authorities provide
corresponding policies for the resolution of domain name disputes concerning country code top-level domains
(“ccTLDs”), such as “.au”. The relevant national policy governing .au domain name disputes is the .au Dispute
Resolution Policy (“auDRP”), which came into force in 2002. Both the auDRP and UDRP have proven to be an
effective mechanism for the quicker and cheaper resolution of domain name disputes. While there has been
considerable academic discourse on the UDRP, there has been very little commentary written on the auDRP. The aim
of this paper is to ﬁll the gap in knowledge on the auDRP by providing a critical and comparative review of key
decisions under both the international and Australian domain name policies.
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Despite the internet’s omnipresence, online content is stored in the physical environment—in computer
devices located all over the globe. These devices that are connected to the internet have a unique
address, known as the Internet Protocol Address (“IP Address”), which is used to establish connections
between them. Typically, IP Addresses take a numeric format (e.g. 203.2.218.214, which is the IP
Address for the Australia Broadcasting Corporation’s website at http://www.abc.net.au/). Domain
names are essentially a human friendly substitute for IP Addresses. Thus, the importance of domain
names becomes visibly clear, as it would be extremely difﬁcult for most humans to remember the IP
Addresses for every single online location (or website) they wish to locate. When IP Addresses are
converted to human friendly alphanumeric strings, such as “abc.net.au”, it becomes easier to remember
(Armon, 2003, pp.101–102). However, the translation of IP Addresses to their alphanumeric format (or
domain names) has given rise to legal disputes. This is because individuals derive rights and/or
legitimate interests in respect of trademarks, as well as personal, corporate and business names, all of
which could be represented in the form of domain names taking the same alphanumeric format. In
short, the negative consequence of establishing domain names is the rise of cybersquatting (Badgley,
2001, pp.345–346).
In order to resolve domain name disputes, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (“ICANN”), the international authority established for the administration of the internet, has
adopted a dispute resolution policy known as the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(“UDRP”). The UDRP applies to disputes concerning generic top-level domains (“gTLDs”),1 and has
been adapted in various jurisdictions for the resolution of domain name disputes involving country code
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top-level domains (“ccTLDs”). In Australia, the relevant local policy for .au domain name disputes is
the .au Dispute Resolution Policy (“auDRP”), which is administered by the .au Domain Administration
Ltd (“auDA”) (Bender, 2007). The auDA is the policy and industry regulatory body for .au domain names.
Among its functions, auDA accredits and licenses registrars to make domain name registrations, develops
and administers policy, and represents .au domain names at ICANN.
Although the auDRP is derived from the UDRP, there are some notable points of divergence, which
have consequentially resulted in panels constituted under the auDRP deviating from their UDRP
counterparts in their approach to resolving similar disputes. This paper undertakes a critical and
comparative analysis of these notable differences in the two policies and the key domain name decisions
awarded by panels under the two policies.
To date, any attempt to compare UDRP and auDRP decisions has been limited to the auDRPOverview
1.0,2 which is based on the corresponding overview of UDRP decisions formulated by the Arbitration and
MediationCenter of theWorld Intellectual PropertyOrganization (“WIPO”).3Despite the auDRPOverview
1.0 being a “compendium of consensus views of panels on key legal and procedural issues under the
auDRP”, it is arguably not exhaustive. This paper seeks to contribute to the discussion commenced by the
auDRPOverview1.0 by comparing panel decisions under a key provision of both policies: paragraph 4(a). It
is under this provision that a complainant is required to establish three distinct elements (which are
considered below) in order to be successful in domain name dispute resolution proceedings.
The First Element
There are no limitations to what domain names could comprise. When generic phrases such as “cars” or
“computers” are used to form a domain name, such as “cars.com” or “computers.com”, there is unlikely to
be any dispute. In contrast, when a domain name closely resembles a registered trademark4 (as well as a
“name”, in the case of the auDRP), and someone other than the owner of the trademark (or bearer of a
name) had registered that domain name, there is a greater likelihood that a dispute might spur. It is for this
reason that both the policies incorporate a requirement that a domain name subject to a dispute must be
identical or confusingly similar to a trademark (and/or name, in the case of the auDRP) in which the
complainant has rights, if the complainant is to succeed.
Thus, in terms of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the UDRP, a domain name registrant must submit to a
mandatory administrative proceeding if a complainant establishes inter alia that the domain name is
identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights. This is
the ﬁrst element that any complainant must satisfy. The corresponding provision in the auDRP replicates
UDRP’s paragraph 4(a)(i) with a minor, yet signiﬁcant, change. Under the auDRP, in addition to stating
that a registered domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark,
complainants may also assert similarity to a “name” in which they have rights.5 The footnote attached to
that provision provides the following clariﬁcation:
For the purposes of this policy, auDA has determined that a “name . . . in which the
complainant has rights” refers to: a) the complainant’s company, business or other legal or
trading name, as registered with the relevant Australian government authority; or b) the
complainant’s personal name.
In order to satisfy this element under both the policies, a complainant must establish two things—ﬁrst,
that the complainant has a “right” in respect of a trademark or service mark (or a name in the case of the
auDRP) and second, that the domain name concerned is identical or confusingly similar to the trademark,
service mark or name, as the case may be.
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Establishing a Complainant’s “Rights”
Rights in Respect of Registered Trademarks
Under the UDRP,6 as well as the auDRP,7 a complainant having a registered trademark easily satisﬁes the
ﬁrst element, although amere application to register a trademark is not sufﬁcient to confer any “rights” on a
claimant.8 In the case of the UDRP, a complainant could establish rights in a trademark irrespective of
where it is registered.9 Whereas, under the auDRP there has been some uncertainty whether rights arising
from trademark registrations outside of Australia could satisfy this requirement, as there have been two
strands of authority. Some panels have expressly opted for a more restrictive view in holding that only
trademark registrations in Australia are capable of establishing rights for the purpose of the ﬁrst element.10
Whereas, the more common view has been that even foreign trademark registrations would sufﬁce.11 The
consensus view is reﬂected in the auDRP Overview 1.0—“The auDRP does not restrict a complainant’s
trademark rights to a trademark registered with the Australian trademark authority”.12 Notably, when this
issue arose in Marshmallow Skins v Piipiinoo, the panel considered these two lines of authority and
expressly decided to take the liberal approach in allowing foreign trademark registrations to supply the
necessary rights for the purposes of this element under the auDRP. The panel observed that it “does not
seek to insert a nationality requirement in the Policy, which does not exist in the text of the Policy”.13
Although the panel was concerned that a literal interpretation of the policy would open ﬂoodgates allowing
“complainant[s] with no connection to Australia to satisfy the ﬁrst element of the Policy and thereby
acquire a “.au” domain name”,14 this concern was negated in view of the following:
(1) It is unlikely that a complainant would expend legal resources preparing a complaint under the auDRP
if it had no connection to, or interest in, Australia.15
(2) The lack of a connection to Australia would be an obstacle in satisfying the other elements of the
auDRP.16
(3) The Domain Name Eligibility and Allocation Policy Rules for the Open 2LDs (2012–04) require some
connection to Australia, before a domain name is allowed registration. Thus, “[t]he Domain Name
Eligibility and Allocation Policy Rules operate to prevent a complainant who relies solely on a foreign
registered trade mark and has with (sic) no connection with Australia from taking possession of a
domain name in the “.au” space that it is not entitled to, even if it obtained an order for transfer under
the Policy”.17
Rights in Respect of Unregistered Trademarks
Rights may also be established with regards to unregistered trademarks where such marks are
inherently distinctive,18 as well as in circumstances where they are less distinctive but have acquired a
“secondary meaning”.19 However, there is a notable difference between the UDRP and auDRP in
relation to unregistered marks—in that, under the latter, unregistered trademarks used only within
Australia are considered for the purposes of establishing a complainant’s rights in relation to a
trademark.20 The auDRP Overview 1.0 reﬂects this position: “evidence that [a complainant] has
unregistered trademark rights outside of Australia is insufﬁcient”.21 Thus, in We Buy Any Car v
Highway Auto Mart, the panel rejected the complaint on the basis that the complainant had never traded
in Australia, despite it having established a reputation, and thereby common law trademark rights, in
the United Kingdom.22 Taking into account the nature of business to which the domain name related in
that dispute, the panel observed that “it seems [. . .] inherently unlikely that an Australian consumer
would sell a motor vehicle in Australia through a United Kingdom based website and business that does
not purport to offer services in Australia”.23 Yet, whether such a consideration should be part of the
analysis in determining whether the ﬁrst element of the auDRP is satisﬁed is questionable. This is so,
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because all that is required is to determine whether the claimant has rights in a name or mark, and
whether there is identity or confusing similarity. This was precisely the approach in Marshmallow Skins
v Piipiinoo when the panel in that case allowed the complainant to rely on rights arising out of a foreign
trademark registration. Moreover, if the consideration whether a claimant had a connection with
Australia, e.g. by trading in Australia, was relevant under auDRP’s ﬁrst element, it is not logical to
apply that consideration only in respect of unregistered trademarks. Thus, in terms of the current
approach adopted by auDRP panels, if the facts of We Buy Any Car v Highway Auto Mart was slightly
altered allowing reliance to be placed on a registered trademark in the United Kingdom, instead of a
common law trademark, the outcome would have been the exact opposite under the ﬁrst element. In
effect, this approach discriminates between registered and unregistered marks. In fact, it is unfortunate
that the panel in We Buy Any Car v Highway Auto Mart failed to refer to PayBurst Financial
Technologies v Virgin Blue Airlines,24 where the claimant’s common law trademark rights in the United
States was regarded as sufﬁcient for the purposes of the ﬁrst element.
In contrast, and in view of the global application of the UDRP,25 a complainant may establish
rights in an unregistered mark through use in any jurisdiction. However, since trademark rights are
strictly territorial in nature,26 whether a complainant enjoys rights in an unregistered mark would
depend on whether such a category of rights is recognized in a particular jurisdiction under
consideration. This may mean that complaints originating in some civil law countries, where trademark
rights are acquired purely through a process of registration, may fail in view of the inability to establish
“rights” in respect of an unregistered mark—an obstacle not prevalent in common law countries. UDRP
panels have been sensitive to this disparity, seeking to give true meaning to the universality of the
policy:
The word “Uniform” in the name of the UDRP is primarily a reference to uniformity across the
gTLDs. At a minimum, implicit in the introduction and scope of the UDRP is its global
application. The Panel takes the view that the Policy needs to be applied as uniformly as
possible across the globe, particularly when dealing with a domain name in one of the gTLDs
(which can be obtained and accessed around the world, irrespective of jurisdiction). Were it
otherwise, on an issue such as this complainants from many civil law jurisdictions would in
certain scenarios be at a disadvantage when compared to their counterparts from common
law jurisdictions and those civil law jurisdictions, such as Germany, which make special
statutory provision for unregistered trade mark rights.27
Thus, for instance, UDRP panels have gone to the extent of recognizing common law “equivalent”
rights in unregistered trademarks on the basis that in certain civil law countries, such as France, the remedy
of unfair competition provides the equivalent common law remedy for passing off—thereby implicitly
vesting a “right” to an unregistered mark.28 The WIPO Overview 2.0 summarizes the position in the
following terms: “For a number of reasons, including the nature of the Internet, the availability of
trademark-like protection under passing off laws, and considerations of parity, unregistered rights can
arise for the purposes of the UDRP even when the complainant is based in a civil law jurisdiction”.29
Rights in Respect of a Name
Complainants under the auDRP, in addition to establishing rights in relation to trademarks or service
marks, may also seek to establish rights in respect of a “name”.30 This possibility allows claims to be
brought in respect of a company, business or other legal or trading name registered with an Australian
authority or a personal name, even in circumstances where no common law rights subsist31—thus,
signiﬁcantly expanding the scope of the auDRP vis-a-vis the UDRP.32
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Under the UDRP, although celebrities such as Tom Cruise,33 Jim Carrey,34 Jay Leno35 and
Beyonce36 were able to establish rights in their personal names, that was on the basis that the name was
made use in actual trade attracting common law trademark rights.Whereas, when no evidence established
the use of a personal name in connection with the sale of goods or services, UDRP panels have denied
complaints on the basis that no rights were established to satisfy the ﬁrst element.37 In contrast, the wider
scope of the auDRP, has allowed auDRP panels to recognize rights not just in relation to conventional
names, but also in respect of nicknames, such as “Warnie” attaching to the world famous Australian
cricketer, even without evidence that the complainant had engaged in actual trade in goods or services
under a particular name.38
Rights in respect of company and business names are dealt with in a similarmanner to personal names,
although at times rights in respect of a smaller part of a company or business name have also been
recognized.39 The possibility of establishing rights in relation to a complainant’s “other legal or trading
name” has also resulted in unusual formats—such as phone words or smart numbers—being considered
for the purposes of the ﬁrst element. Thus, in John Kolenda v 1300 Phonewords Pty Ltd, a panel found that
the complainant had rights in the phone word “1300homeloan”, even though it neither constituted the
complainant’s company or business name, nor his personal name.40 However, in later decisions, whether a
phone word could really constitute a “name” has been doubted,41 although there is a possibility that phone
words may attract registered or common law trademark rights. Thus, the position in relation to phone
words or smart numbers is rather uncertain under the auDRP.42
Establishing Identity or Confusing Similarity
Once a complainant establishes rights in respect of a trademark (or name in the case of the auDRP), the
panel then must consider the extent to which that trademark (or name) is identical or confusingly similar to
the domain name sought to be canceled or transferred through the administrative proceeding. The
approach towards this aspect of the ﬁrst element has been similar under both the UDRP and auDRP.43
All domain names must be preﬁxed and sufﬁxed by “www.” and the relevant domain (e.g. “.com”, “.
com.au” etc), respectively, given the way in which domain names operate within the internet’s
technological architecture. However, in assessing similarity, both UDRP and auDRP panels have ignored
the technical preﬁx and sufﬁx attached to a domain name.44 The approach to the assessment of similarity
was succinctly set out, in the context of the UDRP, in Advance Magazine Publishers v. MSA:
Panels have routinely held that the question under paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy is simply
whether the alphanumeric string comprising the challenged domain name is identical to the
Complainant’s mark or sufﬁciently approximates it, visually or phonetically, so that the
domain name on its face is ‘confusingly similar’ to the mark.45
Thus, in cases where the name or mark is identical to the disputed domain name (given that a domain
name’s preﬁx and sufﬁx are ignored in the analysis) the assessment should be fairly straightforward and the
complainant’s burden of proof should be easily met. In GlobalCenter v Global Domain Housing, a panel
constituted under the auDRP seeking to apply the stance under the UDRP observed that “[a]s is the case
under the UDRP, essential or virtual identity is sufﬁcient for the purposes of the Policy”.46 The auDRP
panel cited four UDRP decisions in support of this view: The StanleyWorks v CampCreek,47 Toyota v S&S
Enterprises,48 Nokia v Nokiagirls.com49 and Blue Sky Software v Digital Sierra.50
However, surprisingly, except in Toyota v S&S Enterprises, the panels in the other three decisions
made no reference to either essential or virtual identity. In fact, those cases were decided on the basis that
either the complainant’s trademarks and the disputed domain names were a 100% match or confusingly
similar (disregarding the relevant preﬁxes and sufﬁxes of the domain names). It was only in Toyota v S&S
auDRP and UDRP Domain Name Decisions Alpana Roy and Althaf Marsoof
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Enterprises that the panel concluded that “[e]ach of the domain names itoyota.com and itoyotas.com is
virtually identical to the complainant’s registered trade mark TOYOTA”.51 Notably, the panel only
referred to virtual identity and not essential identity in coming to its conclusion, although it did refer to a
trademark infringement case where a court in the United States had held that “planned-parenthood.com”
was essentially identical (the only addition being a hyphen) to the “Planned Parenthood” trademark.52
However, at a later point in the decision the panel observed:
Virtual or essential identity is sufﬁcient for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy. The
panel ﬁnds the complainant has established both sufﬁcient identity and confusing similarity.53
Thus, the UDRP panel’s overall treatment of the concepts of essential and virtual identity on the one
hand and confusing similarity on the other hand is far from clear. It is not clear whether virtual identity and
essential identity signify different standards of identity or in the alternative, whether they simply mean
confusing similarity with a lower threshold of proof. Unfortunately, the WIPO Overview 2.0 does not
provide any guidance in this regard.
Nevertheless, in view of GlobalCenter v Global Domain Housing, the concept of essential or virtual
identity has seeped into the auDRP, although the panel in that instance ultimately held in favor of the
complainant only on the basis that the complainant’s name “GLOBALCENTER”was confusingly similar
to the disputed domain names “globalcenter.com.au” and “globalcenter.net.au”. GlobalCenter v Global
Domain Housing is the second oldest auDRP decision and is the very ﬁrst to introduce the concept of
essential or virtual identity. Since then, however, auDRP panels have utilized this concept in subsequent
decisions,54 although panels have not provided any clariﬁcation as to what essential or virtual identity
actually means. Panels have also been inconsistent as to when they apply the concept. For instance,
although in Tourism Tasmania v Gordon James Craven the panel found “DISCOVERTASMANIA” to be
essentially identical to “discover-tasmania.com.au” (the only addition being the hyphen),55 in Camper
Trailers v Off Road Equipment the panel found “Camper Trailers WA Pty Ltd” to be virtually identical to
“campertrailerswa.com.au” (“Pty Ltd” of the company name being omitted from the domain name).56 This
may indicate that essential and virtual identity dictates different levels of identity. Yet, in typical typo-
squatting disputes where the disputed domain name and the name or trademark in which the complainant
established rights were the same apart from a single letter being added, omitted or replaced (e.g.
“ARGILETS”/argilitz.com.au), panels have not referred to the concept of essential or virtual identity and
have instead gone on to decide the dispute based on confusing similarity.57 In contrast, most UDRP panels
in corresponding typo-squatting disputes have sought to analyze the facts using the “virtual identity”
standard,58 although in some instances they have not done so.59 Thus, although both UDRP and auDRP
panels share the view that complaints alleging typo-squatting would normally satisfy the ﬁrst element of
either policy,60 there is uncertainty as to whether the element could be satisﬁed on the basis of “virtual” or
“essential” identity on the one hand, or “confusing similarity” on the other.
What the discussion hitherto illustrates is that to-date, just as under the UDRP, under the auDRP there
is uncertainty as to where in the scale between “100% identity” and “confusing similarity” that “essential”
or “virtual” identity lies. Any guidance in this regard in the auDRPOverview 1.0 is limited to the following
statement: “The test for identity is that there is “essential or virtual identity” between the domain name and
the trademark or name in which the complainant has rights”.61 This uncertainty is however not a cause for
concern, because when a trademark or name is essentially or virtually identical to a disputed domain name,
the threshold for confusing similarity is easily achieved.62
In contrast to the assessment of essential or virtual identity, the assessment for confusing similarity is
more uniform between the UDRP and auDRP policies. The assessment for confusing similarity has been
set out by a UDRP panel as follows:
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The issue is not whether confusion is likely in the trade mark sense (that is, confusion as to
source based on the domain name and its use in connection with a website), but rather, whether
the domain name, standing alone, is sufﬁciently similar to the trade mark to justify moving on
to other elements of a claim for cybersquatting.63
This approach to assessing “confusing similarity” has been followed by auDRP panels. For example,
in GlobalCenter v Global Domain Housing, the panel observed (citing relevant UDRP decisions) that
“[l]ikewise, the test of confusing similarity under the Policy is conﬁned to a comparison of the disputed
domain name and the name or trademark alone, independent of the other marketing and use factors usually
considered in trademark infringement or unfair competition cases”.64 Since then, auDRP panels have
applied this “confusing similarity” test.65 Thus, in making the comparison, whether the name/mark and the
disputed domain name are descriptive,66 the nature of the goods or services in relation to which the domain
name is being used,67 or the contents of the website to which the domain name resolves68 are all irrelevant
considerations. Similarly, where the trademarks in which rights are asserted contain design elements,
both UDRP and auDRP panels have tended to ignore the design elements focusing on the textual
elements alone.69
There is also consistency between the approaches under the two policies in relation to the assessment
of confusing similarity between a trademark (or name) and a disputed domain name which copies the
trademark (or name) along with an added descriptive, generic or geographic element. The auDRP
Overview 1.0 provides that the general position under the auDRP is the same to that of the UDRP,70 the
general consensus under the latter being that an added element is insufﬁcient to avoid a ﬁnding of
confusing similarity.71
In the UDRP’s context, this approach has been adopted by some panels even where the added generic
term is of a negative or pejorative nature—e.g. by incorporating theword “sucks” after a famous trademark
to form “[trademark]sucks.com”. Thus, in Air France v MSA, the panel found “airfrancesucks.com” to be
confusingly similar to the “AIR FRANCE” mark:
The present Panel accepts that an ordinary user, familiar with the English language, is unlikely
to expect that a domain name comprising the word “suck” or “sucks” appended to a familiar
trademark would be operated by the trademark owner. However, that does not mean that
the composite domain name can never be “confusingly similar” to the trademark at issue [. . .]
The Complainant has pointed out that not all users are familiar with English. In this case, the
Complainant is a French business. It is conceivable that a user from France or some other
country unfamiliar with English might assume that “suck” had a different meaning or was
perhaps an acronym for a type of business (like “GmBH”, or “S.A.”, for example) and that
others might even perceive the Domain Name as “Air Frances Uck”.72
The ﬁnding of the panel in Airfrance v MSA is justiﬁed, since a majority of Air France customers were
not native English speakers and would have found the addition of “sucks” relatively insigniﬁcant when it
appeared next to the famous “Air France” mark. Yet when a famous trademark is sufﬁxed by “sucks” in
circumstances where a signiﬁcant majority of the complainant’s customers are English speaking, it is
reasonable to assume that the outcomewould be different. Thus, inAsda v.Mr Paul Kilgour, ASDA being a
popular supermarket chain in the United Kingdom, the panel concluded, “Internet users will be well aware
that a domain name with a “-sucks” sufﬁx does not have the approval of the relevant trade mark owner”.73
However, UDRP panels have not been consistent in this regard. Thus, inWal-Mart v Richard MacLeod, a
dispute concerning the famous American supermarket chain “Wal-Mart”, the panel observed that “[n]o
reasonable speaker of modern English would ﬁnd it likely that Wal-Mart would identify itself using wal-
martsucks.com”.74 Despite coming to that ﬁnding, however, the panel concluded as follows:
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. . .the Panel concludes that a domain name is “identical or confusingly similar” to a trademark
for purposes of the Policy when the domain name includes the trademark, or a confusingly
similar approximation, regardless of the other terms in the domain name. In other words, the
issue under the ﬁrst factor is not whether the domain name causes confusion as to source (a
factor more appropriately considered in connection with the legitimacy of interest and bad
faith factors), but instead whether the mark and domain name, when directly compared, have
confusing similarity.75
Thus, the position under the UDRP in relation to “sucks” cases has not been consistent, although a
majority of panels have concluded that the addition of “sucks” to the end of a trademark is not sufﬁcient to
avoid a ﬁnding of confusing similarity.76
To-date, a panel constituted under the auDRP has not had the opportunity to determine a “sucks”
dispute. On this issue the auDRP Overview 1.0 states that the position is unknown.77 Unfortunately, it is
going to be difﬁcult to predict a possible outcome of a “sucks” dispute. Although auDRP panels are
unanimous in their views that the test for confusing similarity is a side-by-side comparison of the disputed
domain name and the trademark or name concerned, confusion in relation to something cannot exist in the
abstract. Thus, it is still necessary to address the question: in relation to what are internet users confused? In
a 2004 decision, a panel having reiterated the side-by-side test for confusing similarity, observed:
In particular, it is not clear what is contemplated to be “confusing” in circumstances where
similar domain names and other names are registered or used by different persons. It could be
that the test of “confusing similarity” is to be applied in much the same way as the test of
“deceptive similarity” in trade mark infringement cases, where the concept of “deception”
contemplates consumers who may be deceived or “caused to wonder” about the source or
origin of goods or services.78
Some panels have suggested that confusion arises where a domain name is capable of being associated
with the complainant. For example, inDorset Council v Mr Damian von Samorzewski, the panel observed:
. . .so there is a possibility that an ordinary internet user could be confused into associating the
disputed domains with the Complainant’s domain, and into believing that there is a real
connection between the disputed domains and the Complainant’s activities.79
Thus, auDRP panels in determining whether internet users are confused, when they come across a
domain name that is similar to a trademark or name, have often considered whether an objective internet
user would associate the domain name with the complainant. If this line of reasoning is adopted, it is likely
that auDRP panels may differ from the majority UDRP decisions in determining corresponding “sucks”
cases under the auDRP. This is because an average Australian internet user would not ﬁnd that a domain
name comprising a trademark and the word “sucks” (or any other equally negative or pejorative term) is in
any way associated with the owner of that trademark. Absent such an association, it would be difﬁcult to
ﬁnd confusing similarity.
The Second Element
Even though a complainant satisﬁes a panel that a third party’s registered domain name is identical or
confusingly similar to the complainant’s trademark (orname), that does not necessarilymean that thedomain
namemust be transferred to the complainant. This is because, just as in assessing a third party’s unauthorized
use of a trademark in typical trademark infringement suits,80 the use of a domain name is context speciﬁc.
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Thus, in some contexts, the third party registrant of a domain name may have a right or legitimate interest
in using that domain name despite its identity or similarity to a trademark or name. Therefore, both the
UDRP and auDRP recognize the context speciﬁc nature of the use made of domain names by requiring
a complainant to establish that the domain name subject to a dispute was registered by a third party
who lacks the requisite rights or legitimate interests.81 This is the second element that a complainant must
satisfy.
The Difficulty of Proving a Negative
The complainant bears the burden of proof under both the UDRP and auDRP. This is because under both the
policies, it is a requirement that the complainant must prove the existence of each of the three elements upon
which a transfer or cancelation of a domain name will be ordered.82 In the context of the second element, an
early UDRP panel had recognised that this would require a complainant “to prove a negative, a difﬁcult, if
not impossible task”.83 Paragraph 4(c) of both policies provides a non-exhaustive list of instances, which if
found could demonstrate that a respondent had rights or legitimate interests in respect of a domain name.
The language of paragraph 4(c) suggests that it is the respondent that must demonstrate the existence of
rights or legitimate interests. In view of this contradiction, earlyUDRP panels were split in their approach as
to the burden of proof under the second limb of paragraph 4(a). While some panels have held that the
respondents have no burden whatsoever to establish any rights or legitimate interests, unless a complainant
furnishes afﬁrmative proof of the respondent’s lack of such rights or legitimate interests,84 some others have
held that, although the burden is on the complainant to establish a lack of rights or legitimate interests on the
part of the respondent, that burden is a relatively light one.85 On the other hand, a few UDRP panels have
held that where the respondent had failed to demonstrate that at least one of the instances envisaged by
paragraph 4(c) applies—which establishes rights or legitimate interests on the part of a respondent—that
“can assist the Panel in deciding whether on consideration of all the evidence a Complainant has discharged
the onus of proof”.86 Despite this disagreement on the complainant’s burden of proof under the second
element, a majority of UDRP panels have held that once a complainant had made out a prima facie (or
credible) case that the respondent lacks any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, then
the burden shifts to the respondent to refute that position.87 The respondent’s rebuttal must be supported by
concrete evidence, that is to say “more than mere personal assertions”.88 This position is reﬂected in the
WIPO Overview 2.0,89 which is also mirrored in the auDRP Overview 1.0.90
Panels under the auDRP have consistently followed the approach adopted by the majority of UDRP
panels. Although not apparent in the ﬁrst auDRP decision,91 from the second decision onwards, panels
have in most instances applied the prima facie standard of proof in relation to the second element. To
illustrate, in GlobalCenter v Global Domain Housing, the panel referred to the UDRP decision in Do The
Hustle v Tropic Web in holding that:
These circumstances are sufﬁcient to constitute a prima facie showing by the Complainant of
absence of rights or legitimate interest in the disputed domain name on the part of the
Respondent. The evidentiary burden therefore shifts to the Respondent to show by concrete
evidence that it does have rights or legitimate interests in that name.92
This approach has been followed in later decisions,93 although there have been a few instances where
panels have deviated from this approach. Thus, for instance, in Find Marketing v Troy Holland,94 Private
Real Estate v Chris Papas,95 Dorset Council v Mr Damian von Samorzewski96 and Andrea Chick v
Countrynet Software,97 the panels determined the dispute under the second element without any reference
to the complainant’s capacity to establish a prima facie case, instead relying on the respondent’s ability to
establish rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain names. However, what was
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common in all those instances was that the respondents were represented and had furnishedmaterial for the
panel to consider in making a determination under the second limb. Thus, it may be posited that the prima
facie standard in respect of the complainant’s case under the second element becomes important in
circumstances where the respondent remains legally unrepresented.
Establishing Rights or Legitimate Interests Under Paragraph 4(c)
As outlined above, both the UDRP and auDRP provide a non-exhaustive list of instances, which if
established by a respondent, could demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a domain name. These
instances are:
(1) Use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain
name in connection with a bona ﬁde offering of goods or services, before any notice of the dispute.98
(2) The Respondent (as an individual, business or other organization) being commonly known by the
domain name, even if no trademark mark rights have been acquired.
(3) A legitimate non-commercial or fair use being made of the domain name, without intent for
commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark at issue.99
These speciﬁc defences (or safe harbors) are considered next.
Bona Fide Use of a Domain Name Before Notice
Although the second and third defences in paragraph 4(c) of both the UDRP and auDRP are identical, the
scope of the ﬁrst defence slightly differs. If a respondent sets up this defence, depending on the applicable
policy, a panel must be conscious as to the timing of such bona ﬁde use. Thus, while UDRP panels must
ensure that the domain name was put to bona ﬁde use prior to the respondent being notiﬁed of the
“dispute”, the defence under the auDRP only applies in circumstances where a respondent made bona ﬁde
use of the domain name prior to being notiﬁed of the “subject matter” of the dispute. Although this
distinction between the UDRP and auDRP has not been highlighted in the auDRP Overview 1.0, auDRP
panels have done so on numerous occasions. The panel inGlobal Center v Global Domain Housing100 was
one of the earliest to recognize this distinction, although it did not specify the consequence of it. However,
later panels have sought to do this. Thus, for instance, in Allianz Australia v Throne Ventures, citing
Shanahan’s Australian Law of TradeMarks and Passing Off (4th ed, 2008), the panel observed as follows:
In order to rely on this [paragraph 4(c)(i) of the auDRP], the registrant needs to demonstrate its
use or preparations to use the domain name prior to being aware of the subject matter of the
dispute, rather than simply prior to notice of the dispute itself. This slight variation from the
UDRP prevents a registrant from using or preparing to use the domain name after knowing that
there may be a dispute but before dispute proceedings are commenced.101
Accordingly, under the auDRP, what becomes relevant is not the date of commencement of
proceedings, but the date on which the respondent became aware of a dispute pertaining to the domain
name.102 This means that any evidence of intended use of a disputed domain name for the bona ﬁde sale of
goods or services that is derived frommaterial prepared after the respondent becomes aware of the subject
matter of the dispute is irrelevant for the purposes of this defence under the auDRP.103
Both UDRP and auDRP panels have considered numerous instances where the question as to whether
a respondent’s use of a domain name attracted sufﬁcient good faith in order to justify the domain name
registration to remain in favor of the respondent. Among them, decisions where panels have had to
consider the legitimacy in the use of domain names by those who resell, distribute or repair the
complainant’s trademarked products are noteworthy and warrant discussion.
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A person that resells, distributes or repairs genuine trademarked products should be permitted to use
the relevant trademark to describe this activity. This is an accepted exception to trademark rights
recognized under trademark law and is necessary to maintain fair competition. By the same logic, when a
domain name incorporates a trademark, which resolves to a webpage owned by a person that resells,
distributes or repairs the products bearing that trademark, such use ought to be permitted as well.
Under domain name law, this scenario comes squarely within the ﬁrst defence of bona ﬁde use.
However, UDRP panels have set out strict criteria before this defence can be used by a domain name
registrant (or respondent). In Oki Data v ASD 104 the Panel, having referred to previous UDRP decisions,
formulated the following criteria that must be met by a respondent in order to establish bona ﬁde use of a
disputed domain name on the basis that it was an authorized reseller of, and a repair center for, the
complainant’s products:
(1) The respondent must as a matter of fact be offering the goods or services at issue.105
(2) The respondent must use the website (to which the domain name resolves) to sell only the
complainant’s trademarked goods.106
(3) The site must accurately disclose the registrant’s relationship with the trademark owner.107
(4) The Respondent must not try to corner the market in all domain names, thus depriving the trademark
owner of reﬂecting its own mark in a domain name.108
Subsequent UDRP panels have followed the criteria set out inOki Data v ASD, often referring to them
as the “Oki Data principles”,109 which now represents the criteria in determining whether resellers,
distributors and suppliers of repair services qualify for the defence.110 The Oki Data principles have later
been extended to circumstances where a respondent had no express or implied authority to use the
complainant’s trademark or deal with its products, but nevertheless was using the domain name to
maintain a website in connection with the resale or repair of the complainant’s products.111
Following Oki Data v ASD, auDRP panels have embraced the Oki Data principles as a means of
balancing the competing interests between the parties to domain name disputes. Accordingly, the auDRP
Overview 1.0 reﬂects the position under the auDRP in the following terms: “The more recent decisions of
auDRP panels have adopted the principles set out in the UDRP case Oki Data Americas, Inc. v. ASD, Inc.,
WIPO Case No. D20010903”.112 The rationale for accepting the Oki Data principles in the auDRP’s
context was succinctly set out by the panel in Clark Equipment v AllJap:
The consensus of panelists’ views on the fairest way of balancing the competing interests of
the parties in such cases has been authoritatively dealt with in the Oki-Data decision, which in
turn has been followed many times since.113
In terms of the scope of the Oki Data principles, it is noteworthy that auDRP panels have extended the
applicability of these principles beyond the realm of resellers,114 distributors115 and repair service
providers.116 Thus, in Holden v Publishing Australia,117 the panel was required to consider whether the
principles applied to a respondent that acted “as an agent for car purchasers—that is, the Respondent
negotiates with authorized car retailers to secure the sale of a car to the client of its car-buying service”.118
It was quite clear that the respondent did not engage in the resale, distribution or repair of the complainant’s
branded vehicles. Applying the Oki Data principles to the respondent the panel observed:
Although these services are not “reselling” services, they are, in the Panel’s opinion,
sufﬁciently analogous to reselling services to make the principles established under the UDRP
in respect of paragraph 4(c)(i) applicable to them. That is to say, the use of a domain name by a
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buying agent can in certain circumstances be a bona ﬁde offering of services under that domain
name. Thus, the Panel considers that the Respondent will have demonstrated a legitimate right
or interest in the disputed domain name if its use of the disputed domain name complies with
the four requirements of Oki Data and is otherwise bona ﬁde.119
The decision inHolden v Publishing Australiawas followed inBMWvPublishing Australia,120 where
the Oki Data principles were applied to a buying agent. However, in Google v. Q Interactive,121 the
respondent’s attempt to argue that the Oki Data principles should apply to an entity that maintained an
online store that sold apps compatible (interoperable) with the complainant’s Android Operating System
(“OS”) was rejected. In this case, the respondent had registered the domain name—“androidappsstore.
com.au”—which resolved to a website that exclusively sold apps that were compatible with the Android
OS. The panel was required to decide whether the respondent’s conduct came within the purview of
paragraph 4(c)(i) of the auDRP and in particular the Oki Data principles. The panel observed that “[t]he
Respondent is neither reselling or distributing goods or services supplied by the Complainant under the
ANDROID trademark, nor providing services that are sufﬁciently analogous thereto”. Moreover, the panel
sought to distinguish the dispute before it from Holden v Australia Publishing. The panel’s reasoning for
its approach was explained in the following terms:
. . .the role of the Respondent in this case is not one of reselling or distributing goods or
services bearing the Complainant’s trademark; rather, it is one of distributing goods or
services (in this case, apps) that are interoperable with other goods or services (in this case,
the Android platform) that bear the Complainant’s trademark. In this Panel’s view, the
provision of a second product that interoperates with a ﬁrst product is a scenario different
from the reselling or distribution of a ﬁrst product, and so the Oki Data principles are not the
ones most appropriate to the circumstances of this case.122
This approach by the panel inGoogle v Q Interactive is not without issues. Holding that the Oki Data
criteria did not apply to the respondent on the basis that it did not resell or distribute goods or services
bearing the complainant’s trademark cannot be justiﬁed in view of the third category of entities to which
the Oki Data principles have been incessantly applied in the past: that is, to persons involved in repairing or
servicing products bearing a complainant’s trademark.123 For instance, a panel constituted under the
UDRP, commenting speciﬁcally on the second Oki Data criteria, observed, “the Panel sees no difference
between selling products or offering repair services for such products as far as this second element is
concerned”.124 Thus, the Oki Data principles are not restricted to resellers and distributors. Second, the
panel’s ﬁnding that the respondent’s services were not sufﬁciently analogous to “reselling services” is
questionable. While it is true that the operations of the respondents in Holden v Publishing Australia and
BMW v Publishing Australiawere sufﬁciently analogous to reselling services, in that they were providing
assistance to those interested in purchasing vehicles bearing the complainants’ trademarks, the same
cannot be said about the provision of repair services. Arguably, if previous panels have applied the Oki
Data principles to respondents providing repair services, it is difﬁcult to explain why the said principles
should not apply to the respondent inGoogle v. Q Interactive. Nevertheless, this approach is not a cause for
concern as the panel in Google v. Q Interactive recognized that the “interoperability” scenario will be
caught up under the descriptive fair use defence available under paragraph 4(c)(ii) of the policy.
In terms of the substance of the Oki Data principles, auDRP panels have generally followed their
UDRP counterparts. In particular, the second (of the four) Oki Data principles—that the website to which
the domain name resolves must be used only for the purpose of reselling or otherwise dealing with the
complainant’s trademarked products—has been applied strictly to the Australian context.125 Notably,
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panels have held that the second criteria would not be satisﬁed if the resolving website made any reference
to other websites (e.g. through hyperlinks) that offer products that compete with the complainant’s
trademarked products,126 further ensuring that a fair balance is reached between the competing parties.
This, however, does not mean that for the second Oki Data criteria to be satisﬁed a respondent must only
engage in the resale of, or otherwise deal with, the complainant’s products alone, provided that the
particular website to which the disputed domain name resolves is devoted entirely to promote the
complainant’s products.127 Of course, in applying the second Oki Data criteria, a certain degree of restraint
has been exercised by auDRP panels:
. . . it is not necessary that the disputed Domain Name be devoted entirely to the sale of the
trade marked goods, provided that the sale of other goods or services is peripheral and
provided that those goods or services were not competitive with the trade marked goods.128
It should be noted that UDRP panels have supported this approach. For example, when a panel ignored
a single hyperlink to another website offering a brand of products that were non-competing with the
complainant’s trademarked products in holding that the respondent satisﬁed the second Oki Data criteria,
that reasoning was justiﬁed on the ground that the website to which the disputed domain name resolved
was regarded “as one concerned overwhelmingly with (the complainant’s) products”.129 This permitted
the panel to regard the single hyperlink as de minimis. However, if the panel was faced with a situation
where hyperlinks contained in the website to which a disputed domain name resolved were more than de
minimis, the outcome may have been different, even if the products promoted in those other websites were
non-competing.
Panels constituted under the auDRP have also expressed similar reservations in respect of the third
Oki Data criteria:
This Panel is not convinced that the Oki Data criteria should be accepted verbatim as
authoritative under the Policy, especially the requirement that there be disclosure of the
registrant’s relationship with the trademark owner. Here the active websites to which
the domain names led did not falsely suggest that the registrant is the trademark owner nor that
the website is the ofﬁcial website of the trademark owner. This Panel does not consider that,
under these circumstances, any such disclosure is required in order to establish legitimacy.130
Thus, although auDRP panels have fully recognized the need for the Oki Data principles in relation to
the auDRP, they have applied them to the Australian context with caution ensuring that their application
does not detract in any way from reaching a fair balance between the rights a complainant may have in
relation to a trademark or name and the interests of a respondent to utilize a domain name for the bona ﬁde
offering of goods or services.
The Respondent Being Commonly Known by the Domain Name
The second defence (safe harbor) that a respondent could rely on reﬂects a common defence that is also
made available under trademark law: that is, the own name defence.131 This allows a domain name to be
registered by a person or entity that is commonly known by that domain name.
One of the key issues that this defence gives rise to is as to when a respondent could be regarded as
being “commonly known” by the domain name. Thus, in circumstances where a domain name reﬂected the
respondent’s real name,132 stage name,133 nickname134 or corporate name,135 UDRP panels have held that
the respondent was commonly known by the domain name provided there was sufﬁcient evidence to that
effect through the external use of that name, prior to registering the disputed domain name.136 In the case
of a real name, establishing this defence should be straightforward since a real name is probably the name
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by which a person is most commonly known. In relation to other types of names, including stage names,
nicknames and corporate names, panels have been more cautious in evaluating the evidence in order to
“guard against the opportunistic adoption of a name purely for the purpose of establishing rights or interest
in a famous mark”.137 Thus, in Royal Bank of Canada v R.B.C. Bank, the panel was unable to hold that the
respondent was commonly known by the domain name, because the corporate name from which the
domain name was derived was not put into any form of use after the corporate name was registered. 138 In
Sting v Urvan the panel held that the respondent was not commonly known by the name “STING”, as the
only use of that name was as a username for an online gaming platform.139 The panel observed that the
username, in fact, provided anonymity to the online gamer (respondent), rather than other online gamers
being able to associate the username with the respondent.140 These examples demonstrate that UDRP
panels have focused on the nature and extent of the use of the respondent’s name in circumstances where
the name relied upon is not a real name in order to determine whether it is reasonable to conclude that the
respondent is commonly known by that name. Thus, a mere assertion that a respondent is commonly
known by a particular name is insufﬁcient to sustain this defence, in the absence of actual evidence of the
name being externally used (as opposed to mere internal use).141 The standard of proof required to sustain
this defence is a balance of probabilities.142
Based on the manner in which this defence is framed, although it may be thought that panels should
uphold the defence once respondents establish that they are commonly known by the domain name, there
have been circumstances where the defence was denied. Thus, in Kraft Foods v The Pez Kiosk, the panel
observed “[e]ven assuming that (‘SUGUS’) is indeed the familiar name by which many friends and
collectors know [the respondent], it is noteworthy that the way in which “SUGUS” is used most
prominently on his website in no way points to this personal connection”.143 In essence, the position under
the UDRP is that even if the requirements under paragraph 4(c)(ii) of the Policy are met, the defence will
fail if the domain name is used in a manner that takes unfair advantage of the reputation of the
complainant’s name or trademark.
Unlike under the UDRP, there have been only a very few instances where auDRP panels have had the
opportunity to consider the second defence under auDRP’s paragraph 4(c).144 However, based on the few
disputes decided under the auDRP, it may be posited that panels have followed the general approach under
the UDRP in this regard. Thus, in the auDRP’s context, for panels to be satisﬁed that a respondent is
commonly known by a disputed domain name, there must be substantial evidence145 to that effect. Such
evidence is to be derived from events or conduct prior to the domain name being registered. Following the
approach adopted by UDRP panels, the panel in Bernard v Bubenicek observed that:
The common meaning of “rights or legitimate interests” does not, in the Panel’s view, admit a
circumstance where a respondent becomes commonly known by a disputed domain name that
it has registered with an intent to appropriate another’s trademark.146
Ideally, evidence derived from “advertising, media recognition, or the extent of. . . sales under (a
particular) name” may be capable of demonstrating that a respondent was commonly known by the
name.147 Such advertisements and media campaigns must, however, bear the name a respondent seeks to
rely on—e.g. the sale and distribution of “Lullaby Concepts BabyMonitors”would not allow a respondent
to claim that it was commonly known by the name “Lullaby Conceptions”, especially when the
complainant’s name was “Lullaby Conceptions Pty Ltd”.148 Thus, auDRP panels have often denied the
defence where the name by which a respondent claims to be commonly known does not correspondent
with the disputed domain name. The decision in Constable Care v The Big Bamboo149 is an apposite
example. Here, the disputed domain name was “constablecare.com.au”. Although the respondent’s
corporate name was not reﬂected in the domain name, it was in evidence that the respondent was the
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proprietor of the registered business name “Constable Care’s Safety Books”. There was sufﬁcient evidence
that the respondent was commonly known by its business name “Constable Care’s Safety Books”. Thus,
the panel had to decide whether the defence under paragraph 4(c)(ii) applied to the respondent. In this
regard, the panel cited three UDRP decisions,150 of which it preferred to adopt the approach in John Hayes
v Vaughan Enterprises and Kronopol v Lamwood, where the UDRP panels had placed emphasis on the
distinctive elements common to both the domain name and the name claimed to be commonly used to
identify the respondent.
In addition, auDRP panels have also considered information in the WHOIS database (that establishes
the registrant’s details of a given domain name) to determine whether or not the paragraph 4(c)(ii) defence
could be sustained. Following theirUDRPcounterparts,151 auDRPpanels have utilizedWHOIS information
to deny the defence to respondents. Thus, in ALDI Stores v Peter Gerard Colless,152 the disputed domain
name was “aldionline.com.au”, whereas theWHOIS information indicated that the registrant was one Peter
GerardColless. In the absence of anyother evidence, the panelwas satisﬁed that therewas nothing to support
the ﬁnding that the respondent might be commonly known by the disputed domain name.153
At times, respondents have argued that they are commonly known by the abbreviation or acronym of a
longer name. The approach adopted by auDRP panels in handling such claims has been consistent with the
approach of their UDRP counterparts. Thus, in The Institute of Arbitrators &Mediators Australia (IAMA)
v Adjudicate Today Pty Limited,154 an auDRP panel left open the possibility for a respondent to be
commonly known by an acronym provided there was substantial evidence to that effect. In this case, the
disputed domain name was “iama.com.au” and the respondent argued that it was commonly known as
“IAMA” the abbreviated form of its business registration. The panel denied the defence on the lack of
sufﬁcient evidence:
Apart from the appearance of the business name registered in New South Wales,
“Investigation, Adjudication, Mediation Australia”, as a headline on the website to which
the disputed domain name has resolved since June this year, none of the extracts from the
websites put in evidence by the Respondent appear to make any use of either of the registered
business names on which the Respondent relies or of the acronym IAMA155
However, the auDRP panel inMGM Home Entertainment and others v McIlroy Group Management
Pty Ltd decided in favor of the respondent on the basis that they had a legitimate interest in using the
disputed domain name “mgm.com.au” as it was the abbreviation of its corporate name ‘McIlroy Group
Management Pty Ltd’.156 The panel came to this conclusion despite the respondent not ﬁling a response,
failing to use the disputed domain name in relation to any online content, and also requesting the domain
name could be transferred for a fee of AUD 100,000. However, in view of subsequent auDRP decisions,157
the approach inMGM v McIlroy cannot be taken to represent the correct view under paragraph 4(c)(ii) of
the auDRP.
Legitimate Non-Commercial or Fair Use of the Domain Name
The third defence incorporated in to paragraph 4(c) of both the policies seeks to recognize “the importance
of non-commercial considerations, in that it is aimed at balancing trade mark rights against other non-
commercial rights and interests, including ‘fair use’ rights and rights to (or interests in) freedom of
expression”.158 In this regard, some of the most common, yet controversial, disputes that both UDRP and
auDRP panels have had to deal with have involved criticism, information and fan websites.
In the context of the UDRP, a key question that panels have had to address is whether the use of a
domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to a complainant’s trademark for the purpose of
maintaining a criticism, information or fan website could be regarded as legitimate non-commercial or fair
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use. UDRP panels have been divided in their approach. Thus, some panels have taken the view that free
speech rights, including the right to criticize, does not extend to cases where the domain name directing
users to the relevant content are identical or confusingly similar to a trademark.159 In one UDRP decision
the panel observed:
The Panel acknowledges that a person is entitled to express his views in a wide variety of
different ways and to various audiences. . . Furthermore, the Panel acknowledges that a person
may make use of a domain name for this purpose, provided that. . . the domain name in
question does not cause confusion or mislead the public.160
On the other hand, some other panels have taken a more liberal approach. Thus, in Bridgestone v
Myers,161 the panel held that a respondent was making legitimate use of “bridgestone-ﬁrestone.net” for a
criticism site in circumstances where the complainant had trademark rights for both “Bridgestone” and
“Firestone”. The panel observed:
In this case, the Respondent’s principal purpose in using the domain name appears not to be for
commercial gain, but rather to exercise his First Amendment right to criticize the
Complainants. The use of the <trademark.net> domain name appears to be for the
communicative purpose of identifying the companies, which are the subject of his complaints.
He is not misleadingly diverting users to his website, as he has not utilized the <.com>
domain and has posted adequate disclaimers as to the source of the website. It does not appear
that his actions are intended to tarnish, or have tarnished, the Complainants’ marks.162
Thus, where the domain name comprises a trademark in its entirety, the fact that the landing page is
devoted to criticizing or providing information to consumers about the trademark at issue should sufﬁce for
the defence to be allowed. This approach has been followed in subsequent decisions.163 The decision in
HJTA v McCauley is important in this regard as it sought to draw a distinction between disputes where
parties (or the panelists) were based in the United States, where free speech rights have greater protection,
and disputes where parties (or panelists) were based in other countries guaranteeing a lesser extent of free
speech rights.164 Referring to prior UDRP decisions, the panel observed that “[i]ndeed, many of the cases
in which trademark.TLD domain names have been transferred, despite claims that the sites were being
used for legitimate criticism, involved non-US parties or panelists”.165 The panel further observed that
“[i]n cases involving US parties and/or panelists, on the other hand, a number of panels have ruled that the
First Amendment does protect trademark.TLD domain names when they are used for legitimate criticism
sites”.166 This panel, analyzing the decisions where panels have transferred domain names to complainants
(despite being used for criticism websites) even where the parties were based in the United States,
observed that in these disputes “criticismwas not the respondent’s primarymotive”.167 In summarizing the
panel’s view as to what ought to be the position under the UDRP, the panel held:
the weight of authority suggests that a consensus is emerging that trademark. TLD domain
names, when used for U.S.-based criticism sites, can constitute a legitimate interest, especially
if there are [no] other indicia of bad faith.168
Unlike in the case of the UDRP, there have been much fewer auDRP disputes in which respondents
have made the argument that the disputed domain name was being used for a legitimate non-commercial
purpose divorced from any commercial activity.169 Yet, of these disputes, not one was decided in favor of a
respondent on the basis that the domain name was being used for a legitimate non-commercial purpose.
The auDRP Overview 1.0 states that the position under the auDRP is “unknown” and that:
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Thus, it is not clear whether and, if so, inwhat circumstances a respondent will be found to
have rights or legitimate interests in a domain name by virtue of a noncommercial or fair use
of it.170
The auDRP Overview 1.0 expresses similar sentiments in respect of criticism and fan websites as
well.171 Therefore, it is difﬁcult to determine as to which of the two UDRP approaches that auDRP panels
are likely to follow in determining whether the use of a domain name in respect of a criticism, information
or fan site amounts to legitimate non-commercial use. In Google v Rytsk, the panel acknowledged the
divergence in the opinion expressed by UDRP panels in relation to this defence, although ultimately the
panel did not have to decide the dispute on the basis of this defence.172 However, the panel shed some light
as to what may be regarded as important in the Australian context in the following terms:
What is fundamental, however, to all such considerations is whether the Respondent is
conducting a criticism site as a matter of fact. In other words, if a respondent wishes to rely on
the criticism site and free speech grounds, hemust prove on the balance of probabilities that on
the facts of the individual case it really is a criticism site that is being conducted and also that it
is being conducted in the pursuit of free speech and not as a guise for an essentially commercial
or other improper purpose.173
In Google v Rytsk,174 the disputed domain name was “googlebay.com.au”, an instance where the
complainant’s trademark was incorporated as part of the domain name.What if the respondent’s site was a
genuine criticism site? Upon considering the panel’s language in this decision: “It is here that the
Respondent’s case falls down. That is so because the Panel is not satisﬁed that the Respondent has
established a genuine criticism site”, one might speculate that the panel may have decided in favor of the
respondent had the site genuinely resolved to a criticism site. This raises the further question: what if the
disputed domain name was “google.com.au”,175 thus leading to <Trademark>.<Tld>?
Since UDRP panels themselves have drawn the distinction between disputes involving parties in the
United States and others,176 it might be reasonable to posit that auDRP panels are likely to adopt the
narrower approach, where free speech rights do not extend to the use of a domain name that is identical or
confusingly similar to a trademark or name. After all, the Australian Constitution does not expressly
guarantee any free speech rights, unlike the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
although the High Court has inferred its existence in a limited capacity.177 However, a perusal of the
decisions thus far does not conﬁrm this supposition with accuracy.
To illustrate, in UEIP v Fincar,178 the disputed domain name was “unitedenergy.com.au”, whereas
the complainant had rights in the “United Energy” trademark. Thus, the domain name fully incorporated a
trademark. In relation to the respondent’s defence under paragraph 4(c)(iii) of the auDRP, the panel
observed: “The website of the domain name, as it currently stands, offers extensive information with
respect to energy related issues. It also provides links to other energy related sites. If that were all that the
website showed there may have been a showing of legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the domain
name”.179 Thus, had the respondent not linked the website to other commercial sites, the paragraph 4(c)
(iii) defence may have succeeded, despite the domain name being identical to the complainant’s mark.
Similarly, in SKYCITY v Trellian, had the respondent actually ﬁled a response, the panel would have
dismissed the complaint because:
With even a very modest amount of effort the Respondent could have made out a legitimate
interest in respect of the Disputed Domain Name by arguing in support of its right to operate a
site warning of the dangers of gambling addiction and providing assistance to those adversely
affected by an inability to control their gambling habits.180
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Notably, the complainant’s business name in which it had rights and the disputed domain name were
identical—“Adelaide Casino/adelaidecasino.com.au”.
There are instances where panels have taken a different view. For example, inDEST v Blogger,181 the
domain name “questacon.com.au”, and “QUESTACON” being the name of an educational institute under
the complainant, the respondent argued that the site to which the domain name resolved was entirely about
Questacon, which made use of the domain name legitimate. However, the panel held: “Internet users
familiar with the nameQuestacon would expect the disputed domain name to lead to a website operated by
the complainant”.182 Despite the respondent’s site being a non-commercial information website, the panel
denied the defence under paragraph 4(c)(iii) to the respondent.
Thus, it is unclear what approach auDRP panels will adopt in respect of a criticism, information or fan
website that makes a non-commercial legitimate fair use of a domain name that is identical or confusingly
similar to a name or trademark in which a complainant has rights. It seems that auDRP panels are as
divided in their views as their UDRP counterparts.
The Third Element
Even though a complainant succeeds in establishing that a domain name, which is identical or confusingly
similar to a trademark (or name in the auDRP’s context), is being used by a third party having no rights or
legitimate interests to do so, a complaint would only ultimately succeed if one ﬁnal element were
established. That is, the complainant must establish that the respondent also acted in bad faith—as required
by paragraph 4(a)(iii) of both the UDRP and the auDRP.
Paragraph 4(b) of both policies provide a non-exhaustive list of circumstances,183 which if found to
exist is evidence of bad faith. The UDRP sets out these circumstances in the following terms:
(1) Circumstances indicating that a domain name was registered or acquired primarily for the purpose of
selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the
owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable
consideration.
(2) Registration of a domain name in order to prevent the owner of a trademark or service mark from
reﬂecting that mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent had engaged in a
pattern of such conduct.
(3) The domain name was registered primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor.
(4) The use of the domain name, intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to
the respondent’s website or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the
complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, afﬁliation or endorsement of your web site or
location or of a product or service on your web site or location.184
In contrast, the auDRP’s corresponding provision is much broader. Accordingly, the circumstances
indicating bad faith under the auDRP are as follows:
(1) Circumstances indicating that the domain namewas registered or acquired primarily for the purpose of
selling, renting or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to another person for valuable
consideration.
(2) Registration of a domain name in order to prevent the owner of a name, trademark or service mark
from reﬂecting that name or mark in a corresponding domain name.
(3) The domain name was registered primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business or activities of
another person.
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(4) The use of the domain name intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to a
web site or other online location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s name or
mark as to the source, sponsorship, afﬁliation or endorsement of that web site or location or of a
product or service on that web site or location.
Dealing with the scope of the auDRP, the panel in Statoil v Creative Domain observed:
. . .there are some signiﬁcant differences between paragraphs 4(b) of the two Policies, with the
auDRP being somewhat less restrictive in relation to sub-paragraphs 4(b)(i) (may be sale, etc
to “another person” rather than just to the Complainant), 4(b)(ii) (no need to show a “pattern of
such conduct”) and 4(b)(iv) (“a website. . .” rather then “your [the Respondent’s]
website. . .”).185
In addition, although not mentioned by the panel in Statoil v Creative Domain, paragraph 4(b)(iii) of
the auDRP is also broader as it has replaced the term “competitor” in the UDRP with “another person”.
Thus, paragraph 4(b) of the auDRP is more favorable to complainants than its UDRP counterpart.
However, upon an analysis of the various circumstances set out in paragraph 4(b) of both the policies,
it may be reasonable to suggest that establishing bad faith on the part of a respondent is a superﬂuous
exercise in circumstances where the complainant has demonstrated a lack of rights or legitimate interests
on the part of the respondent in using the disputed domain name—for a lack of, at least, a legitimate interest
should be sufﬁcient to dispel good faith on the part of a respondent. However, upon a closer consideration
of themanner inwhich the “bad faith” element has been framed andworded under paragraph 4(a)(iii) in the
respective policies, it is not surprising that auDRP panels have diverged signiﬁcantly from their UDRP
counterparts in their analysis of the relationship between the “right and legitimate interests” and “bad
faith” elements under the respective policies.
The “and”/“or” Issue
The third element as framed under the UDRP requires a complainant to establish that the disputed domain
name “has been registered and is being used in bad faith”.186 Thus, the bad faith element in the UDRP
imposes a conjunctive requirement. In contrast, under the auDRP the “and” has been replaced with “or”—
thus, requiring a complainant to establish either bad faith registration of a domain name by the respondent
or its bad faith use, but not both.
The conjunctive language incorporated into the UDRP’s bad faith element resulted (and still does) in
some problematic outcomes. For instance, when UDRP panels were initially faced with disputes involving
domain names that were registered in bad faith, but were being passively held (i.e. without being used in
relation to any active website), panels have had to overcome the difﬁculty imposed by the conjunctive
requirement through innovative interpretation. Thus, in Telstra Corporation v Nuclear Marshmallows, in
circumstances where the disputed domain name neither resolved to, nor was publicly advertized in relation
to, any website or online location and where there was no evidence that the respondent had offered to
transfer the domain name for valuable consideration, the panel observed:
The signiﬁcance of the distinction is that the concept of a domain name “being used in bad
faith” is not limited to positive action; inaction is within the concept. That is to say, it is
possible, in certain circumstances, for inactivity by the Respondent to amount to the domain
name being used in bad faith.187
Similarly, inWWF v Bosman,188 even though the disputed domain name did not resolve to any active
website, the respondent’s post-registration conduct in offering to sell the domain name to the complainant
auDRP and UDRP Domain Name Decisions Alpana Roy and Althaf Marsoof
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The Journal of World Intellectual Property (2016) Vol. xxx, no. xxx 19
was regarded as sufﬁcient to establish both bad faith registration and use for the purposes of
UDRP’s paragraph 4(a)(iii). The general position in respect of non-use is reﬂected in the WIPO
Overview 2.0:
...panels have found that the apparent lack of so-called active use (e.g., to resolve to a website)
of the domain name without any active attempt to sell or to contact the trademark holder
(passive holding), does not as such prevent a ﬁnding of bad faith.189
If not for this expansive interpretation by UDRP panels, circumstances in which a respondent
registered a domain name in bad faith, but made no use of it in relation to any online content, could have
resulted in disputes being decided in favor of the respondent, despite the respondent’s obvious bad faith.
In contrast, auDRP panels have avoided this problematic outcome in view of the disjunctive language
found in the policy’s paragraph 4(a)(iii). Thus, non-use of a domain name (passive holding) is immaterial if
the domain namewas registered in bad faith, as “the auDRPdoes not require a complainant to prove both that
the disputed domain name has been registered and used in bad faith. Proof of either limb is enough to satisfy
the requirements of Schedule A, paragraph 4(a)(iii)”.190 Nevertheless, auDRP panels have followed the
approach adopted by their UDRP counterparts in holding that circumstances where the respondent offers to
sell the domain name for valuable consideration is sufﬁcient to indicate bad faith use.191
However, where the real problem lies is not with “non-use” situations, but rather with “subsequent”
bad faith use situations. In view of the conjunctive language in the UDRP, there have been a signiﬁcant
number of instances where panels have had to deny complaints despite there being very clear evidence of
bad faith use of the disputed domain names at the time the complaints were lodged. Thus, in Telaxis
Communications Corp v William E. Minkle192 the respondent registered the disputed domain name at a
time when the complainant had not obtained trademark rights in the phrase comprising the domain name.
However, notwithstanding the acquisition of trademark rights on the part of the complainant, the
respondent refused to transfer the domain name to the complainant despite several requests and instead
directed the domain name to competing and pornographic sites. Clearly, the use to which the respondent
put the domain name was in bad faith. Yet, the panel denied the complaint on the basis that the original
registration of the domain name was not in bad faith and hence the conjunctive requirement resulted in the
complaint being denied. Similarly, inMiele v AACP193 the disputed domain name was registered when the
respondent was an authorized distributor of the complainant’s goods. Later, even after the distributorship
agreement was revoked, the respondent having refused to transfer the domain name to the complainant,
directed the domain name to the website of a non-proﬁt organization. Despite evidence of bad faith use of
the domain name, the panel denied the complaint as the original registration of the domain namewas not in
bad faith. The more recent decision of Cosmetic Research Group v John Miller,194 which shared a factual
similarity with Miele v AACP, was decided in the exact same manner. Similarly, in Leipa Pack v Ulrich
Brunhuber195 the domain name was registered with the complainant’s consent when the respondent was a
shareholder of the complainant company. Despite the status quo subsequently changing, the panel denied
the complaint on the basis of the conjunctive language in UDRP’s paragraph 4(a)(iii).
What the above decisions demonstrate is that despite there being clear evidence of bad faith use at the
time a complaint being ﬁled, if the domain name was originally registered in good faith, the complaint
would be denied notwithstanding the obvious hardships caused to the complainant.196 This is a direct
consequence of the conjunctive language used in the UDRP.197
Since the auDRP utilizes disjunctive language in its corresponding bad faith provision, the
problematic outcome surrounding cases of “subsequent” bad faith use prevailing under the UDRP does not
persist under the auDRP. The general position under the auDRP has been summarized in the auDRP
Overview 1.0 in the following terms:
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In any event, paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the auDRP requires that the domain name has been
registered or subsequently used in bad faith for the third requirement to be satisﬁed. Unlike the
equivalent provision in the UDRP, the word “and” is not used; thus, the issue of whether a
complainant must establish both bad faith registration and bad faith use does not arise. As a
result, registration even one that is demonstrably in good faith of the domain name prior to
the complainant acquiring rights in its mark or name will not protect a respondent from a
ﬁnding that the third requirement is satisﬁed where it is established that the respondent
subsequently used the domain name in bad faith.198
In Sterling Marine v The Trustee of the Costa Family Trust,199 which had similar facts to the UDRP
decisions Miele v AACP and Leipa Pack v Ulrich Brunhuber, the panel decided in favor of the
complainant, although the initial registration of the disputed domain name was not in bad faith. A similar
outcome was reached in Cobb International v Cobb Australia, in which case although the respondent was
permitted to register and use a domain name bearing the complainant’s trademark and business name
during the existence of a distributorship agreement, this entitlement ceased when the distributorship
agreement was terminated. In these circumstances, the panel observed in relation to the registration of the
domain name:
It is plain that the disputed domain namewas registered and was being used in connection with
the Distribution Agreement with the Complainant’s knowledge and consent. The registration
of the disputed domain name, therefore, was not in bad faith.200
The panel then considered the situation after the distributorship was terminated:
The Panel considers that this passive retention of the disputed domain name to assist in
negotiating a resolution of the commercial dispute between the parties qualiﬁes in the totality
of the circumstances as use in bad faith under the Policy.201
Thus, what these decisions demonstrate is that unlike in the case of the UDRP, in circumstances where
only subsequent bad faith use of a domain name is claimed, a complaint would succeed irrespective of
whether the respondent registered the domain name in good faith.
The Relationship Between the “Bad Faith” and “Rights or Legitimate Interests” Elements
The conjunctive language in the UDRP’s bad faith element, and the disjunctive language in the auDRP’s
corresponding provision, has impacted the relationship between the bad faith element and the rights and
legitimate interests element in the respective policies. Neither the WIPO nor the auDRP Overviews
consider this issue.
Both policies require that the complainant must establish all three elements in paragraph 4(a). The
failure to establish even one element would result in the complaint being denied. Thus, in instances where a
complainant fails to establish a lack of rights or legitimate interests to the domain name on the part of the
respondent, panels have often denied the complaint on that basis alone, there being no necessity to consult
the bad faith element under the policy.202 In any case, where a respondent does have a legitimate interest in
using a disputed domain name, it is unlikely that the domain name is being used in bad faith.
In circumstances where a complainant succeeds under the rights and legitimate interests element, the
bearing that ﬁnding has on the panel’s ﬁnding under the bad faith limb depends on the policy applicable to
the dispute. To illustrate this point, two similar disputes under both the policies may be compared: that is
Miele v AACP (a dispute under the UDRP) andCobb International v Cobb Australia (under the auDRP). In
Miele v ACCP, the panel denied the complaint on the basis that the initial registration of the disputed
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domain namewas not in bad faith.203 However, in respect of the rights and legitimate interests element, the
panel observed:
The Panel ﬁnds that, as an authorized dealer of Miele vacuum cleaners, the Respondent
initially had a legitimate interest in the domain name. The Panel notes that the Complainant
has not alleged that the Respondent violated a dealership contract or agreement between them
that limited the Respondent’s ability to use the MIELE mark. In the absence of a dealership
contract or agreement between the parties that limited the Respondent’s interest in using the
MIELE mark to bring attention to his authorized business selling Miele products, the Panel
ﬁnds that the Respondent initially had a legitimate interest in the domain name.
However, to the extent Respondent had such an interest, it was an interest derived from his
dealership relationship with Complainant. Once the Respondent lost its status as an authorized
dealer, the derivation of its interest terminated and it lost that legitimate interest in the domain
name.204
Thus, although at the time of the dispute the respondent clearly had no legitimate interests, let alone
any rights, in using the domain name, the complaint was denied on the basis that the domain name was
registered in good faith. In effect, a ﬁnding of a lack of rights or legitimate interests on the part of the
respondent at the time of the dispute had no bearing whatsoever on the ﬁnding under the bad faith element
and therefore the outcome of the decision.
On the other hand, in Cobb International v Cobb Australia, although the auDRP panel found that the
domain name was initially registered in good faith, it found that there was subsequent bad faith use. In
these circumstances, the panel observed the following with respect to rights and legitimate interests:
While Halcyon would appear to have been using the disputed domain name legitimately when
the Distribution Agreement was on foot, it now says it has sold off all remaining stock on hand
so, at present, it would not appear to have any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed
domain name.205
Thus, a ﬁnding that a respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in using the domain name at
the time of the complaint was ﬁled would also lead to a ﬁnding that the domain name was being used
in bad faith. Since, unlike in the case of the UDRP, the auDRP’s bad faith element does not entail a
conjunctive requirement, it may be posited that there is a distinct relationship between the bad faith and
rights and legitimate interests elements of the auDRP. In that, in every case where a complainant had
succeeded under the rights and legitimate interests element of the auDRP, the complainant would have also
succeeded under the bad faith element.206 However, as illustrated above, this is not the same situation
under the UDRP.
Conclusion
The key objective of this paper was to perform a comparative and critical analysis of the key UDRP and
auDRP decisions that have been considered over the period of time since the two dispute resolution
policies came into existence. Although the auDRP has been derived from the UDRP, incorporating similar
principles, there are some notable instances of divergence. While the divergence in the approaches of
auDRP panels from their UDRP counterparts may be primarily attributed to the difference in the
phraseology adopted under the two policies, there are also instances where panels have diverged despite
identical language being used.
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First, the paper considered paragraph 4(a)(i) of both policies, which in the case of the UDRP requires a
complainant to satisfy that the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or
service mark in which the complainant has rights. The auDRP has broadened the scope for complainants
by also allowing complainants to satisfy rights in respect of a name, in addition to a trademark or service
mark. Decisions under the auDRP have given effect to this distinction. It was also noted that complainants
under either policy may establish rights in registered trademarks irrespective of where they are registered.
Despite the auDRP being applicable exclusively to Australian domain names (e.g. .com.au and .net.au), a
majority of auDRP panels have allowed foreign trademark registrations to satisfy this criteria. However, in
respect of unregistered trademarks, although UDRP panels have allowed complainants to set up rights
through use of trademarks in any jurisdiction, auDRP panels have generally insisted that rights must
emanate from within Australia. In effect, auDRP panels seem to discriminate between registered and
unregistered marks. In respect of the establishment of identical or confusing similarity, it was noted that
auDRP panels have tended to follow their UDRP counterparts, which has resulted in some of the
uncertainties under the UDRP seeping into auDRP decisions.
Second, the paper considered paragraph 4(a)(ii) of both policies, which deals with rights or legitimate
interests of the respondent in respect of a dispute domain name. It was noted that auDRP panels have
consistently followed the approach under the UDRP in respect of the burden of proof and have recognized
the difﬁculty in proving a negative. The common approach under both the auDRP and UDRP is to require
the complainant to establish a prima facie case that the respondent lacks any rights or legitimate interests in
the disputed domain name, upon which the burden shifts to the respondent. Paragraph 4(c) in both policies
sets out a non-exhaustive list of defences, which if did exist would exhibit rights or legitimate interests on
the part of respondents.
The ﬁrst of those defences (paragraph 4(c)(i)) under the UDRP deals with instances where a
respondent had made bona ﬁde use of the domain name before notice of the dispute. The corresponding
defence in the auDRP is worded differently, in that a respondent must establish bona ﬁde use before notice
of the subject matter of the dispute. This has resulted in panels constituted under both the policies analysing
the timing of facts claimed by parties to a dispute in different ways, resulting in a greater burden for
respondents under the auDRP. However, in applying this defence to entities that have registered and used a
disputed domain name for the resale, distribution and repair of a complainant’s trademarked products,
auDRP panels have followed, albeit with some restraint, the “Oki Data” principles that were laid down in
Oki Data v ASD, a decision under the UDRP.
It was also noted that auDRP panels have followed the approach adopted under theUDRP in respect of
the second defence (paragraph 4(c)(ii)) dealing with instances where a respondent is commonly known by
the disputed domain name. Perhaps the only odd decision under the auDRP is MGM v McIlroy, which
seems to have ignored prior decisions under both the policies and therefore cannot be regarded as setting
out the correct view.
The defence incorporated in paragraph 4(c)(iii) of both the policies refer to instances where a
respondent demonstrates a legitimate non-commercial or fair use. This defence has been used to justify the
use of domain names for criticism, information and fan websites on the basis of free speech doctrine.
UDRP panels have been divided as to whether free speech rights extend to domain names themselves,
especially where domain names are identical or confusingly similar to protected trademarks. Panels
constituted under the auDRP have recognized this division, although since there have been only a few
decisions where this defence has been considered, it is difﬁcult to ascertain which line of UDRP decisions
would be preferred in the Australian context.
Third, and lastly, the paper considered paragraph 4(a)(iii) of both policies, which deals with bad faith.
On this issue reference was ﬁrst made to paragraph 4(b) of both policies, which sets out a non-exhaustive
list of instances that could demonstrate bad faith on the part of respondents. It was noted that there are
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aspects of paragraph 4(b) of the auDRPwhich are broader than the corresponding paragraph in the UDRP,
resulting in the auDRP being more favorable to complainants.
Paragraph 4(a)(iii) itself contains a key difference. While under the UDRP a complainant must satisfy
that a respondent had both registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith, under the auDRP it is
sufﬁcient to satisfy either bad faith registration or subsequent bad faith use of the domain name. This has
resulted in auDRP panels deciding in favor of complainants in instances where domain names were being
used in bad faith at the time of the complaints being ﬁled, although respondents may have registered those
domain names in good faith. In contrast, UDRP panels have generally denied complaints even if the
disputed domain name was being used in bad faith at the time the complaint was ﬁled in the event it was
shown that the original registration of the domain name was in good faith. It was noted that this aspect of
paragraph 4(a)(iii) in the auDRP signiﬁcantly favors complainants, whereas the corresponding provision
in the UDRP tends to lead to unjustiﬁable outcomes.
Both the UDRP and auDRP have now entered their second decade, and have proven to be successful
dispute resolution mechanisms given that the vast majority of domain name disputes are not decided in the
courts, but are settled under the respective policies. As domain name jurisprudence continues to grow
internationally, it will be important to undertake further critical and comparative studies in this area in
order to develop a sophisticated understanding of the subtle differences (and similarities) in domain
name law(s).
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Notes
1. They are domain names ending with: .biz, .com, .info, .mobi, .name, .net, .org.
2. This is an informal overview of auDRP panel positions on key procedural and substantive issues
published by auDA. See auDAOverview of Panel Views on Selected auDRPQuestions First Edition
(July 2014) (“auDRP Overview 1.0”), auDA: <http://www.auda.org.a/assets/Policies/auDRP/
auDRP-Overview/auDRP-Overview-2014b.pdf> at 27 October 2015.
3. See WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Second Edition (“WIPO Overview
2.0”), WIPO: <http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/overview/> at 27 October 2015.
4. Service marks are essentially trademarks that are used in respect of services. The functions of service marks are
precisely the same as trademarks, and therefore in this paper reference is only made to trademarks, unless the
particular context requires otherwise.
5. auDRP, Schedule A, paragraph 4(a)(i) (hereinafter, a reference to paragraph 4 of the auDRP refers to the
paragraph in Schedule A of the policy).
6. See e.g. RapidShare AG and Christian Schmid v majeed randi, WIPO Case No D2010-1089 (17 August 2010).
7. See e.g. TrueLocal Inc., Geosign Technologies Inc. and True Local Limited v. News Limited, WIPO Case No
DAU2006-0003 (29.5.2006) (“TrueLocal Inc. v News Ltd.”).
8. Under the UDRP, see e.g. Aspen Grove, Inc. v Aspen Grove, WIPO Case No. D2001-0798 (5 October 2001);
Spencer Douglass MGA v Absolute Bonding Corporation, WIPO Case No D2001-0904 (5 September 2001).
Under the auDRP, see e.g. Marshmallow Skins, Inc. v Piipiinoo Australia Pty Limited WIPO Case No
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DAU2013-0015 (24 June 2013) (“Marshmallow Skins v Piipiinoo”); Avid Life Media Inc v Melody Carstairs,
WIPO Case No DAU2011-0001 (9 March 2011).
9. WIPO Overview 2.0, Question 1.1. See e.g. Drugstore.com, Inc. v. Nurhul Chee/Robert Murry, WIPO Case No
D2008-0230 (9 May 2008):
. . .it is consensus view among Panelists that if a complainant owns a registered trademark it
satisfies the threshold requirement of having trademark rights. A decision on whether the
Complainant can also claim rights in the Common-Law Mark is not necessary, as the
Complainant undisputedly owns the Registered Mark, and the strength of such mark is not
relevant in this regard either.
10. See e.g. Brilliance Publishing, Inc. v My Brilliance Pty Ltd/Ceinwen Schneider, WIPO Case No. DAU2013-
0007 (28 May 2013); We Buy Any Car Limited v Highway Auto Mart and Jason Collings, WIPO Case No.
DAU2012-0004 (11 April 2012).
11. See e.g. Rainbow Sandals, Inc. v. Malua Point Holdings Pty Limited, Anthony Brown/Malua Point Holdings Pty
Limited a/k/a Malua Point Merchants, WIPO Case No DAU2013-0014 (7 July 2013); Smart Voucher Ltd T/A
Ukash v Chowdhury, MD Abu Russel and Sydney Business & Technology Group Pty Ltd, WIPO Case No.
DAU2013-0006 (8 May 2013); TeamViewer GmbH v Nigel Burke, WIPO Case No. DAU2012-0027 (19
December 2012); Hutchinson Wines v Amphora Wine Group Pty Ltd, William Howard, WIPO Case No
DAU2011-0008 (21 April 2011); TrueLocal Inc. v News Ltd. (n7).
12. auDRP Overview 1.0, Question 1.1A.
13. Marshmallow Skins v Piipiinoo (n8).
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid. But see, TrueLocal Inc. v News Ltd. (n7), where the panel disagreed with the decision in GE Capital
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206. See e.g. Pelican Products, Inc. v Terri Curyer, WIPO Case No DAU2011-0021 (26 October 2011), Bayerische
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Marsoof, 2015).
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